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Introduction
1
 
Democratic governance means that peoples’ ideas and opinion are translated into formal 
legal frameworks and laws, which then – through (local) implementation processes – 
determine actual policy practice (Deutsch, 1970). Particularly in areas of policy-making 
that tend to be highly politicised, such as immigration, academic debate has long circled 
around the question of why these regulatory processes often fail to achieve the desired 
outcomes or declared objectives (Boswell, 2007; Castles, 2004; Freeman, 1995; Joppke, 
1998; Lahav & Guiraudon, 2006; Sassen, 1996; Soysal, 1994). More specifically, 
scholars have identified a gap between the official aims of immigration policies – which 
increasingly reflect the rising public pressure to restrict further unwanted immigration – 
and their often more liberal outcome regarding not only the admission of foreigners to 
the country but also their access to various social and economic rights (Cornelius, 
Martin, & Hollifield, 1994; Hollifield, 1986). This article aims to contribute to this 
debate through a detailed analysis of the processes, arguments and actors involved in 
the implementation of one particular set of rules, which very well exemplifies this gap: 
the extension of the right to access publicly funded healthcare services to those 
foreigners whose very presence in the host country is deemed ‘illegal’.  
Facing significant numbers of irregular immigrants already living within their territory, 
many Western governments have resorted to measures of internal immigration control, 
which tend to intersect with various other strands of mainstream public policy, and 
particularly the welfare regime (Broeders & Engbersen, 2007; Lahav & Guiraudon, 
2006; Van Der Leun, 2006). While this often means that because of their administrative 
status these individuals are formally excluded from many of the host state’s institutions, 
it has been argued that in everyday practice their exclusion is almost never absolute but 
usually intertwined with simultaneous processes of inclusion (Chauvin & Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012; Cvajner & Sciortino, 2010; De Genova, 2013; Mezzadra, 2011). In 
part, this is because the responsibility to actually enforce this kind of immigration 
control is spread across a wide range of institutions and individuals who do not 
necessarily share the immigration authorities’ interests and priorities (Boswell, 2007; 
Walsh, 2014; Webber, 2014). This is particularly evident in the area of public 
                                                 
1
 The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh 
Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n° 316796.  
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healthcare, where powerful normative entitlements, as well as intrinsic functional logics 
and a particularly strong professional ethics often demand at least a certain level of 
access for foreign residents irrespective of their immigration status (Ambrosini, 2015; 
Dwyer, 2015; Hall & Perrin, 2015; Spencer, 2014). At a time of significant cuts to 
healthcare budgets and widespread anti-immigrant sentiments, however, institutions and 
individuals providing and administering public healthcare services to local residents 
also face a heightened pressure to differentiate between those who (medically) need and 
(morally) ‘deserve’ a particular treatment, and those who do not. Health reforms in both 
the UK and Spain have been accompanied by intense political debates around the issues 
of ‘health tourism’ and the presumed ‘pull effect’ (‘efecto llamada’) often attributed to 
an explicitly inclusive health provision (DOTW, 2013; Wind-Cowie & Wood, 2014).  
In order to capture the actual difficulties that migrant irregularity entails for local health 
provision I focus on both the role of individual service-providers and the legal-
institutional structures in which their actions and decisions are embedded. Brunsson’s 
(1989, 1993) contribution to organisation theory offers a promising theoretical approach 
that helps to explain how organisations respond to contradictory external demands and 
pressures by accepting and internalising certain inconsistencies between what is 
officially declared (‘talk’), what is put into law (‘decisions’) and what is effectively 
done (‘actions’). The two cases compared here suggest that depending on the broader 
political context, the level of politicisation and specific framing of the issue of irregular 
migration, governments tend to either resort to what Brunsson (1993) calls 
‘justification’, as arguably is the case in Catalonia, or ‘hypocrisy’, which resembles the 
situation in the UK. My analysis shows that especially where decision-makers feel 
unable to openly justify at least a certain level of inclusion towards irregular migrants, 
they have to resort to a contradictory rhetoric and ambiguous legal frameworks in order 
to still be able to manage – at least politically – the inherent conflicts between 
humanitarian norms and public health concerns on the one hand, and budgetary 
constraints and the logic of immigration control on the other. In practice, much of the 
responsibility to mediate between these contradictory pressures is thereby dumped on 
those who implement these policies ‘on the ground’. In the following sections I will first 
outline the theoretical framework, then give some examples of how different political 
actors have been framing the issue in both cases, before taking a closer look at how the 
resulting legal-political frameworks shape organisational and individual action.  
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1. Public institutions as local mediators between conflicting functional 
imperatives of the state: The case of healthcare for irregular migrants 
One particularly influential strand of literature trying to explain the discrepancy 
between officially declared policy objectives and their actual outcomes in terms of an 
extension of rights to non-nationals focuses on the role of (liberal) institutions 
(Guiraudon, 2003; Joppke, 1998). For Boswell (2007, p. 83) these approaches are based 
on two crucial assumptions: That institutions ‘have sufficient independence from the 
political system and rival administrative agencies’ and that ‘the actors within these 
institutions operate according to interests and norms that are at variance with those 
predominating politics or rival agencies’. While helpful in highlighting the fundamental 
role that institutions generally play in mediating policy outcomes, however, such neo-
institutional approaches ‘often fail to specify the source of their resilience vis-à-vis state 
interests’ (Boswell, 2007, p. 76). What she therefore proposes is a theory that departs 
from the idea that states themselves are driven by various functional imperatives: (a) to 
promote a just distribution of resources (fairness), (b) to provide security for its subjects 
as well as (c) the necessary conditions for the accumulation of wealth, and (d) to respect 
the constitutional principles and individual liberties of those affected by its jurisdiction 
(institutional legitimacy). While each of them represents a precondition for legitimate 
governance, they tend to have contradictory policy implications and are therefore 
difficult (or even impossible) to fulfil simultaneously. Based on these premises, her 
refined explanation for the identified ‘gap’ between (restrictive) policy objectives and 
(more liberal) outcomes is that ‘a state unable to meet all functional requirements may 
have an interest in the persistence of contradictions and inefficiencies in policy’ 
(Boswell, 2007, p. 93).  
What interests me here, is how these inconsistencies in policy (as well as political 
rhetoric) are then perceived and dealt with by those institutional and individual actors 
administering or providing public healthcare to local residents; to what extent they are 
involved in – or effectively shielded from – immigration law enforcement; and what 
degree of individual discretion is thereby given to different professional roles within 
these institutions. My analysis thus places a stronger focus on the institutional and 
individual levels than that of the state and thereby draws on Brunsson’s (1993, p. 489) 
interpretation of the possible relationships ‘between the ideas of constituencies and 
leaders on the one hand and organizational, and societal actions on the other’. Whereas 
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the conventional model of rational decision-making holds that ideas always precede and 
control action, he shows that this does not necessarily have to be the case where it 
would lead to unresolvable conflicts at the level of policy implementation. Instead, 
(necessary) actions can either determine ideas or be systematically inconsistent with 
them. Both, I will argue, is likely to be the case where irregular migrants are to be 
granted some form of access to public healthcare in spite of their unlawful residence.  
As the basis for every human being’s individual autonomy, self-fulfilment and dignity, 
access to health is underpinned by strong formal entitlements safeguarded through 
regional and international human rights instruments (da Lomba, 2011; MdM, 2014; 
OHCHR, 2014). At the same time, healthcare constitutes one of the core functions of 
the welfare state and has thus been described as an ‘aspect of modern citizenship’ 
(Aasen, Kjellevold, & Stephens, 2014, p. 162). In Boswell’s (2007) terms, then, the 
comprehensive provision of health services – whether regarded as a basic and equal 
right (and thus an issue of fairness), or a necessary measure against potential threats to 
public health (and thus a question of security) – represents a functional imperative of the 
contemporary welfare state. As such, it tends to conflict with the need to control 
immigration, since the entitlement to access a particular state’s healthcare services is 
underpinned by both a human and a membership right (da Lomba, 2011; Hall & Perrin, 
2015). The inclusion of irregular migrants is thus not a purely humanitarian issue but 
also reflects their (at least partial) recognition as de facto members of society. Their 
accessing of such services could thus be argued to constitute an ‘act of citizenship’, 
which Isin (2008, p. 16) defined as ‘practices of becoming claim-making subjects in and 
through various sites and scales’. In practice, even limited formal entitlements can 
create perceptions of inclusion, belonging or even a right to remain, while serious health 
problems or the need for a particular treatment unavailable in the country of citizenship 
can effectively further legal claims for regularisation and impede (or delay) deportation 
(Kraler, 2011; PICUM, 2009). Hence, while it is relatively easy for politicians to 
declare that those not admitted to stay should be unable to benefit from any free public 
healthcare provision, the idea of fully excluding them – even if popular among the 
public – would create significant conflicts if it was to completely control organisational 
action within the healthcare system. It is for such instances that Brunsson (1993) 
proposes two alternative (theoretical) relationships between ideas and actions, which he 
calls ‘justification’ and ‘hypocrisy’. The former means that ‘planned or accomplished 
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actions are defended in order to convince people that they are the right ones’ (Brunsson, 
1993, p. 500). If successful, it thus adjusts the constituency’s ideas to actions, thereby 
restoring consistency at the expense of control (of ideas over action). For example, 
people may be convinced that the necessity to provide healthcare even in non-
emergency cases can prevail over the need to control or limit immigration by any 
means. Where decision-makers find it impossible to openly justify the formal inclusion 
of irregular migrants, however, they have to resort to ‘hypocrisy’, that is, accepting 
inconsistencies between what is said, decided, and effectively done:  
Actions that are difficult to justify can be compensated for by talk in the 
opposite direction. Decisions, too, can be part of hypocrisy; they can be 
contrary to actions, compensating for action rather than controlling or 
justifying it. Through hypocrisy, the ideas of the constituency are isolated 
from action (Brunsson, 1993, p. 501).  
What according to Brunnson (1989, p. 38) theoretically links ‘talk’ and ‘action’ are 
‘decisions’, which ‘are fundamental to organisations in which politics play an important 
part’. When it comes to irregular migrants’ access to public healthcare, politicians are 
supposed to decide in which cases to offer, deny, or require payment for a particular 
service, and do so through more or less explicit laws and regulations. But since 
‘drawing administrable lines that define the limits of a shared humanitarian ethic can 
prove difficult’, as Hall and Perrin (2015, p. 132) have argued, these decisions will 
often ultimately depend on the medical assessment of each case by individual health 
professionals. Where it is decided that access is to be contingent on legal residence 
status it is then also on them to exercise some form of immigration control, which – 
while probably supported by a majority of constituents – may well contradict their own 
interests or organisational norms. Here, a certain ambiguity in what politicians say and 
decide not only increases individual actors’ own discretion but thereby also makes these 
obvious contradictions less visible to the public: ‘If decisions are ambiguous it is easier 
to interpret them as consistent with ideas, both when the decision is made and when the 
action is completed’ (Brunsson, 1993, p. 499). The underlying conflict between the 
state’s competing functional imperatives is thereby not solved but merely shifted onto 
the healthcare system or other implementing agencies. Before looking at how different 
actors then perceive and deal with these contradictory moral and legal demands, the 
following chapter provides a number of concrete examples for ambiguous talk and 
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decisions from my two case studies. The empirical sections of this paper draw on some 
of the material collected during my fieldwork in London (between July 2014 and 
February 2015) and Barcelona (from March to October 2015), including official policy 
documents, media reports, and a total of 19 semi-structured interviews with healthcare 
administrators (policy officials and reception staff), professionals (doctors and nurses), 
as wells as representatives of NGOs and advocacy groups working in this field.  
 
2. Between hostility and pragmatism: The ambivalent legal-political context 
for the local provision of public healthcare services to irregular migrants 
Both in the UK and in Spain healthcare is delivered within predominantly tax-based 
national health systems (NHS) that were originally founded – in 1948 and 1986, 
respectively – on the principles of universal coverage and free and equal access (Aasen 
et al., 2014), but have recently undergone significant reforms and restructuring 
(Department of Health, 2010; Legido-Quigley et al., 2013; MdM, 2014). While mainly 
aiming at increasing their overall cost efficiency, these reforms also linked access rules 
to immigration status, and thus require the healthcare system to exercise some form of 
immigration control. In Spain, the national health reform of 2012
2
 categorically 
excluded irregular migrants – with the exception of emergencies, minor children and 
pregnant women – from free public health care by invalidating their health cards 
(‘Tarjeta Sanitaria Individual’, TSI) to which they had been entitled automatically and 
irrespective of their immigration status once registered as local residents (MdM, 2014). 
In March 2015, however, the Spanish minister of health announced in an interview that 
the central government was planning to restore the right of migrants in irregular 
situations to access primary healthcare services provided within the NHS. This move 
has become necessary, according to the minister, for a number of ‘practical reasons’ 
such as to ‘avoid saturating the emergency services’ that these persons otherwise tend to 
fall back on (“El Gobierno anuncia que devolverá parte de la atención sanitaria a los 
inmigrantes sin papeles,” 2015). While thus recognising a certain need to provide them 
with some form of access, however, the government does not foresee irregular migrants’ 
formal re-inclusion into the mainstream system. In fact, the minister made very clear 
                                                 
2
 Enacted through Royal Decree-Law 16/2012, of 20 April, on urgent measures to ensure the 
sustainability of the national health system and improve the quality and safety of its provisions. 
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that he is ‘completely against’ making them holders of the TSI, which ‘would give them 
a right that in Europe does not exist in any other country’ (ibid.).  
In the UK, on the other hand, irregular migrants are currently not formally excluded 
from accessing free NHS primary healthcare – generally provided by local family 
doctors (‘General Practitioners’, GPs) – but as ‘Overseas Visitors’3 they are to be 
charged the full cost of accessing secondary (i.e. hospital) care (Department of Health, 
2013a, 2013b). This charging regime, first introduced in 2004, has been further 
extended by the Immigration Act of 2014, which brings significant changes regarding 
many migrants’ access to healthcare. One of its main objectives is that ‘those persons 
who are here unlawfully should not remain and should have no entitlement to benefits 
or public services’ (Department of Health, 2013b, p. 27). It is also them who would 
most likely be affected by an eventual tightening of access to certain primary care and 
Accident and Emergency (A&E) services (Department of Health, 2013b; Grove-White, 
2014). This declared policy goal clearly reflects the UK governments’ officially 
declared strategy of creating ‘a really hostile environment for illegal migration’, as 
expressed by Home Secretary Theresa May in May 2012 (Kirkup & Winnett, 2012). 
Contrary to this approach, however, then Immigration Minister Mark Harper, debating 
the 2014 Immigration Bill in the House of Commons (2013) Public Bill Committee in 
November 2013, stated the following:  
I can reassure […] that we will not do anything that will worsen public 
health. Of course it is important for those who are in the United Kingdom, 
even if they are not here legally, to have access to public health treatment, 
because it has an impact not just on them, but on the rest of the community.  
In both cases, the ministers’ statements reflect some of the inherent contradictions 
between the pressure to restrict the access to these scarce public resources to 
‘legitimate’ members of the community and the need for pragmatic solutions for those 
who do reside within a given locality but without the formal consent of the responsible 
government. In both countries the restrictive reforms have been accompanied by intense 
debates and critique from health professionals and civil society organisations, often 
highlighting the importance of universal coverage for preventing the spread of 
communicable diseases but also, for example, the detection of domestic violence and 
                                                 
3
 The official category used for all foreigners who are not ‚ordinarily resident’ in the UK, including those 
holding tourist or visitors’ visa, as well as those residing in the country without authorisation. 
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abuse (MdM, 2014; semFYC, 2012). From an economic perspective, it has been argued 
that early and preventive treatment is cheaper than long intensive care, which often 
becomes necessary as a result of excluding patients from primary care (Aspinall, 2014; 
FRA, 2015; Steele, Stuckler, McKee, & Pollock, 2014; Wind-Cowie & Wood, 2014).  
An important structural difference between both cases is that in Spain the responsibility 
for the provision of healthcare is devolved to the level of its 17 autonomous regions, 
and that the restrictions imposed by the healthcare reform of 2012 were effectively 
prevented through legislation enacted by several regional governments. While explicitly 
aiming at a better coordination and overall consistency of service provision, it thus 
provoked very different responses across the country (DOTW, 2013). The government 
of Catalonia – only four months after the entry into force of the health reform – 
established its own administrative norms
4
, according to which irregular migrants 
explicitly continue to have access to free healthcare provided and financed through the 
Catalan public health service CatSalut. The apparent disagreement between the different 
levels of government and the resulting contradictions between formal rules of access has 
contributed to a general climate of misinformation and confusion (MdM, 2014).  
In the UK context, the Greater London Authority (GLA) – although not vested with 
comparable legal powers in the area of health but also recognising the importance of 
universal coverage of primary care – published a leaflet in 20 languages to raise 
awareness among migrants and asylum seekers and support them in registering with a 
GP (see fig. 1). It particularly emphasised that migrants are not legally required ‘to 
prove their identity or immigration status to register with a practice’ and that GPs 
cannot refuse registration on discriminatory grounds (Mayor of London, 2012). 
Launched in January 2012 as part of the Mayor’s Integration Strategy, it came as a 
reaction to the frequent misinterpretation of existing norms regarding (particularly 
irregular) migrants’ access to NHS services, and has been heavily criticized by right-
wing pressure groups for further encouraging ‘health-tourism’ (Johnson, 2012). Around 
the same time, a poster campaign in NHS facilities specifically reminded those ‘visiting 
the UK, or not living here on a lawful and settled basis’ that they ‘may have to pay’ for 
their healthcare (see fig. 2). Arguably, both the poster’s image and text emphasise the 
role of NHS staff in deciding and controlling who has to pay, and play with irregular 
migrants’ uncertainty (if not fear) of being detected and apprehended as a result of 
                                                 
4
 Through Instrucción 10/2012 del CatSalut, of 30 August 2012. 
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accessing public healthcare.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These examples suggest that in both contexts local institutions and healthcare workers 
have, at various times, received contradictory signals (even though primarily directed at 
the general public and/or irregular migrants themselves) and instructions regarding the 
relevance that a patient’s immigration status should have when accessing a service they 
provide or administer. In the following, I thus turn to their perspectives in order to 
compare how the resulting policies work in everyday practice, thereby differentiating 
between primary and secondary care.  
 
 
3. Negotiating the legal limits of access and provision: the role and agency of 
healthcare providers and administrators in London and Barcelona 
 
3.1 Irregular migrants’ access to primary healthcare 
According to the legal frameworks currently in place, third-country nationals residing 
unlawfully in either London or Barcelona are formally entitled to access free primary 
healthcare services provided locally by family doctors and GPs. In practice, however, 
Figure 1 Figure 2 
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they can remain effectively excluded even from this most basic provision as a result of 
administrative barriers, because they are not aware of their entitlement, or because they 
fear being reported to immigration authorities (OHCHR, 2014). Especially the latter 
seems to be a bigger issue in London than Barcelona, and particularly among those 
migrants who never had a residence permit and are not in regular contact with a support 
organisation. Almost 90% of the over 1500 patients received by Doctors of the World 
(DOTW, 2013) in London during the year 2012 were not registered with a GP and when 
‘we ask people for the reasons why they haven’t been to the [regular] health service 
[…], like one in five say they think they will be arrested if they go and see a doctor’ 
(lon-A03), says Lucy Jones, the organisation’s Programme Director for the UK. In both 
countries, their entitlement is primarily based upon the recognition of local residence, 
which they have to prove by providing more or less specific documentation. In Spain 
this is generally done through the obligatory inscription in the municipal register 
(‘padrón’), which constitutes the primary requirement for all residents to benefit from 
any public service provided at the local level and – in the case of irregular migrants – to 
apply for regularisation under a mechanism called ‘arraigo social’ after three years of 
continuous residence. Registration is thus possible irrespective of immigration status, 
and migrants in irregular situation are explicitly encouraged to do so. Recognising the 
difficulties they often face in providing a permanent address, some local authorities, 
including that of Barcelona, offer them the possibility to register ‘without fixed abode’.  
For irregular migrants registered in Catalonia – in contrast to most other parts of Spain – 
the only formal access requirements are that they declare insufficient financial resources 
and have been registered locally for the past three months (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 
2013). Notably, this temporal limitation is justified as a necessary measure against 
(often intra-European) ‘health-tourism’, rather than to prevent irregular residents from 
accessing these services, as the Citizen Relations Manager of CatSalut explained to me 
in an interview conducted in June 2015 (bcn-A17). As for all residents, applications are 
made at the local health centre (‘Centro de Atención Primaria’, CAP) where applicants 
have to produce a document obtained from the National Institute of Social Security 
(INSS) certifying that they are not covered under the national system, an official 
confirmation of their residential registration and a copy of their passport or other ID 
(Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2013). Only where insufficient documentation inhibits this 
Providing public healthcare to irregular migrants  
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standard procedure, applications are often processed through NGOs like Salud Y 
Familia, as the responsible administrator of one CAP explains:  
Before, those who came without anything, without papers, were handled 
here. There was an application form for all those who came without papers 
and we processed them here. But with the new law this group has been 
diverted to associations that are dedicated to doing just that.  
[Interviewer:] So the law itself establishes that these associations have this 
role?  
Well, it has been agreed between CatSalut and these associations. The 
instruction [10/2012] simply says that these people without papers will be 
attended, that’s what CatSalut says [...], but then, the procedure of how we 
apply this is now that these associations are doing it (bcn-A08).   
It is important to emphasise that here, ‘without papers’ refers to the lack of a patient’s 
identification, not the ‘illegality’ of his or her residence, which per se does not hinder 
their inclusion into the mainstream system, as the same interviewee later clarifies:  
For me, the undocumented are those who come by boat [‘patera’] with what 
they have on them, with no identification or anything, and these come 
through the associations. But those who came by plane [i.e. on a tourist visa, 
which they overstayed] and have a passport... I attend them and process 
their application without any problem (bcn-A08).  
Her perception is supported by a qualitative study carried out by the Public Health 
Agency of Barcelona, which found no significant difference between the self-reported 
experiences when accessing healthcare between regular and irregular migrants (Agència 
de Salut Pública de Barcelona, 2011). The ‘Platform for Universal Health Care in 
Catalonia’, an umbrella group of health professionals and NGOs dedicated to 
documenting the ‘often arbitrary application of the new health regulations in Catalonia’, 
found 72 cases of arbitrary exclusion of migrants, of which more than half (54%), 
however, were lawful residents (PASUCAT, 2014).   
In order to register with a GP practice in London – as in the rest of the UK, where no 
general system of residential registration exists – applicants have to provide other forms 
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of ‘proof of address’, usually a tenancy agreement, utility bill or bank statement in the 
name of the applicant
5
. While practices have an obligation to provide emergency and 
immediately necessary treatment to any person within the practice area, they can 
exercise some degree of discretion about whether or not to register a person; or to treat 
them privately, i.e. as self-paying patients (da Lomba, 2011). Importantly, other than in 
Catalonia there is no specific legislation regulating the provision of primary care to 
Overseas Visitors or establishing a minimum period of prior residence, so that persons 
staying in the country for less than three months may either be registered as ‘temporary 
residents’ or be included in the regular patients list (Department of Health, 2012). GPs 
can refuse a patient on reasonable, non-discriminatory grounds – for example, because 
they live outside the catchment area
6
 – or if their list is full (Aspinall, 2014; Wind-
Cowie & Wood, 2014). Even regarding the widespread practice of requiring personal 
identification at registration, the British Medical Association (BMA) advises practice 
staff, that ‘[o]verseas visitors have no formal obligation to prove their identity or 
immigration status to register with a practice’7. According to Doctors of the World 
(DOTW, 2013), however, over two thirds of London’s Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) 
have issued guidance that is incompatible with GPs’ legal obligations; for example, by 
advising them to only register people living lawfully in the UK for more than six 
months. While in fact this ‘ordinary residence’ criteria only applies to secondary care, it 
is sometimes extended to primary care, as the account of one GP I interviewed in South-
East London reveals:  
It’s true that we have a very good system that is free at the point of delivery, 
but you still have to have an NHS number. That means that you would need 
to be a resident in the UK for at least 6 months in a year. […] If, for 
example, you are visiting for a short time, you do have to pay even to see a 
GP. […] So… I mean, sometimes we do try and help as much as possible, 
[…] but it depends, of course. It’s different from one doctor to another, from 
one surgery to another, even in primary care. I mean I personally would like 
to … to do that … I mean, I’d probably try and help patients to get 
                                                 
5
 Alternatively, other official letters, telephone bills, etc. stating the name and address are usually 
accepted.  
6
 Since 5 January 2015, GP practices in England are free to register new patients who live outside their 
practice boundary area (see: http://www.nhs.uk/nhsengland/aboutnhsservices/doctors/pages/patient-
choice-gp-practices.aspx) which means that they don’t necessarily have to ask for proof of address.  
7
 See: BMA guidelines on overseas visitors and primary care: http://bma.org.uk/practical-support-at-
work/gp-practices (24/4/15).  
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[registered], even though sometimes they are not eligible, so it’s probably 
not right… but… it’s difficult. I think it’s sometimes the right thing to do. 
It’s for the best interest of the patient (lon-A25).  
The Department of Health (2012) also acknowledges that – in contradiction to current 
rules – ‘some practices have deregistered or failed to register people they believe to be 
‘ineligible’ in some way due to their immigration status’. Other practices are well aware 
of the problem and deliberately exercise explicitly liberal access policies, as the head 
receptionist of a GP practice in Hackney is keen to emphasize:  
No, we don’t check people’s passports, we don’t check if people are 
allowed [to stay] 6, 7 or 8 months according to the stamp of their passport, 
or how they got here… that is not something we police at our health centre. 
We don’t police the service that we provide to people. Others do, but we 
don’t (lon-A14).  
At the same time, she also recognises that what she describes as ‘our doctors’ decision’ 
– to not (anymore) verify the patients’ identity or even address – sometimes creates 
more work for reception staff (for example, due to multiple registrations) and makes it 
more difficult to deliver follow-up treatment.  
Ultimately, these accounts also highlight the crucial role of individual discretion and its 
increasing intersection with immigration regulations: On the one hand, the ambiguous 
concept of ‘emergency’ ‘gives considerable discretionary power to health professionals 
by letting them decide whether some types of care should be considered as “emergency 
care” or not’ (DOTW, 2013, p. 41; OHCHR, 2014). The responsible doctor at one CAP 
in Barcelona’s central district Ciutat Vella (quite proudly) maintains that this allows 
him to basically treat everyone, without breaking the law:  
We [as doctors] can decide that. And so that opens a door for us to make 
different exceptions when we think it is appropriate from a medical point of 
view. […] According to the law you can treat any urgent [case], someone 
that you consider is an urgent case. And I can consider that everything that 
comes through the door is an urgent case (bcn-A14).  
On the other hand, and this is particularly true for the UK context, there is a tendency of 
healthcare staff increasingly being expected to form part of the state’s efforts to police 
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immigration rules. Especially GPs, as the main ‘gatekeepers’ of the NHS system8, are 
thereby put in a difficult position:  
If that happens – because there has been also talk about that we should be 
one of the first…well…to put barriers, and we should actually identify 
people
9
 – it can be difficult with confidentiality. If for example, someone 
comes in and they are an illegal immigrant and I see them as an emergency 
and they say ‘oh please don’t say I am [irregular]’… then this is… I don’t 
know what to do in that situation. I wouldn’t know (GP, lon-A25, 2).  
In the UK in particular, negative media and public discourses focusing on ‘health 
tourism’ and/or the need to discourage ‘illegal’ immigration by all possible means 
threaten to not only undermine legal entitlements and individual doctors’ duty of care 
(DOTW, 2013), but also jeopardise confidentiality and trust, which are essential to the 
doctor-patient relationship and necessary for a correct diagnosis and successful 
treatment (Kilner, 2014; Wind-Cowie & Wood, 2014). It is here that a major difference 
between the two cases becomes apparent: While in both contexts studied, access to free 
primary healthcare formally includes (or at least not excludes) irregular migrants, in 
Catalonia this is done through a much more explicit legal framework and a specific 
administrative procedure. Both imply and reflect a political decision through which 
politicians formally justify the necessary inclusion of these local residents. This 
arguably reduces the pressure on individual providers and administrators of care, as the 
following accounts of a receptionist and a family doctor of another CAP of Ciutat Vella 
suggest:  
It is simpler for us [to register a person with regular papers] because it is 
very automatic and easier to introduce them [into the system]. But well, now 
that we have this type of health card [for persons in irregular situations], 
which we didn’t have before, also in their case – once they fulfil the 
requirements – we automatically put them on, we assign them a doctor, give 
them appointments, etc. (bcn-A13). 
                                                 
8
 The UK Dept. of Health (2010, p. 27) recognises the ‘the crucial role that GPs already play in 
committing NHS resources through their daily clinical decisions – not only in terms of referrals and 
prescribing, but also how well they manage long-term conditions, and the accessibility of their services’. 
9
 What she refers to is the Dept. of Health’s (2013a, p. 52) suggestion that GPs – as well as A&E staff – 
may ‘identify in the referral letter any patient whom they believe may be an overseas visitor, which the 
relevant NHS body could then check’.  
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Look, for me they simply appear on the list of patients that I am going to see 
on that day, whether in a regular consultation or as an urgent case […] So 
this patient, who in principle is in an irregular situation, appears on my list, 
and I don’t question anything (bcn-A12).  
In the UK in contrast, irregular migrants accessing NHS care always constitute ‘an 
exception to the rule that makes eligibility contingent on lawful residence’ (da Lomba, 
2011, p. 363), which means that, in the words of a London-based health advocate,  
[…] there isn’t a system here that you have to go through and get a 
certificate from somewhere which you then take to the hospital, so either 
you are in, and anybody can be in, or you are not in. But there is confusion 
about who is in and who is not in, and that’s the difficulty (lon-A08).  
Some of the resulting difficulties regarding the inclusion of irregular residents as well as 
the differences in the formal rules and regulations between the two cases compared 
become even more pronounced when looking at the level of secondary care.  
 
3.2 Irregular migrants’ access to secondary healthcare 
While in practice, primary and secondary care are closely linked – through internal 
referral systems, etc. – access to the latter implies much higher costs to the healthcare 
system and is therefore subjected to stricter rules and controls. According to the legal 
framework established in Catalonia in 2012, migrants in irregular situations were only 
given normalised access to secondary care after a continuous residence of one year, 
while any specialised treatment required before that had to be authorised, on a case-by-
case basis, by a special commission within CatSalut, as the Citizen Relations Manager 
explained to me in June 2015: 
The so-called Commission of Exceptional Access to Programmed 
Specialised Care was created to deal with those cases [of patients] that did 
not have access to specialised care but because of their illness had to be 
treated; and [of those] we have had 60 or 70 cases a year... that is, there are 
very few people who are asking us […] to be treated or admitted to a 
hospital during that first year. […] 
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[Interviewer:] And what is the decision of this commission based on, then?  
The decision is based on a clinical report issued by a hospital, saying 'this 
person with this diagnosis would have to be provided access to specialized 
care’. And so there is this Commission formed by a jurist, a purchasing 
specialist, a hospital doctor, a member of the citizen relations department, 
and there is also a pharmacist... and between these professionals they 
analyse the case and then say yes or no. Basically in all the cases presented - 
I think that 99% - they said yes (bcn-A17).  
Only one of the health centre receptionists I interviewed remembered ‘one or two non-
urgent cases’, where they had suggested their patients to wait until they fulfilled the 
one-year residence requirement (bcn-A08). While from the perspective of CatSalut, 
upholding this temporary distinction between ‘irregular’ and ‘normal’ patients thus 
seemed to create both extra work and unnecessary delays, Medicos del Mundo (MdM, 
2014) had criticised the absence of transparent criteria to be applied by the commission 
when determining each individual case. Together with the constant pressure of 
professional associations such as PASUCAT, this led the government to abolish the one 
year waiting period in July 2015, through instruction 8/2015, thus giving irregular 
migrants access to the full range of publically funded services after only three months of 
(proven) residence (Blay, 2015).  
In the UK, on the contrary, since 2004 all foreigners who are not ‘ordinarily resident’ – 
which is not explicitly defined in law but is conditional, among other things, on lawful 
residence – are considered Overseas Visitors and thus, in principle, have to pay for NHS 
hospital treatment
10
 (Aspinall, 2014; da Lomba, 2011; Department of Health, 2013a). 
Any treatment that is considered ‘urgent’ or ‘immediately necessary’ cannot ‘be delayed 
or withheld pending payment’, but Overseas Visitors will be charged the full cost 
(Department of Health, 2013b, p. 55). As noted before, the discretion in taking these 
decisions – since always based on a medical assessment of the patient’s condition – 
comes with the very nature of the doctor’s profession and thus necessarily plays a 
significant role within every healthcare system (semFYC, 2012). In the case of the UK, 
                                                 
10
 Until 2004, like in Catalonia between 2012 and 2015, they were entitled to free treatment after 12 
months of, even irregular, residence in the country. Exceptions from the general charging regulations are 
in place for certain cases, such as the diagnosis and treatment of a regularly updated list of communicable 
diseases.  
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however, where treatment offered to Overseas Visitors is defined as ‘urgent’ where it 
‘cannot wait until the person can be reasonably expected to return home’ (Department of 
Health, 2013a, p. 43), clinicians are required to take into consideration the likelihood 
(and possible duration) of a patient’s stay in the country (da Lomba, 2011). Both 
directly depend on his or her immigration status and are particularly difficult to assess 
in the case of irregular migrants, who are estimated to represent more than 60% of the 
‘chargeable population’ (Department of Health, 2012, 2013a).  
The UK Department of Health (2013b, p. 13) emphasises that all ‘[r]esidency based, 
tax-funded systems rely on the identification of those who are not entitled rather than 
those who are, with the onus on staff to identify those who should be charged.’ While in 
the case of Catalonia the level of entitlement (depending, among other things, on 
income and employment status) is clearly indicated on every patient’s personal health 
card, Overseas Visitors in the UK, once registered with a GP, will hold the same NHS 
card as any other NHS patient, lacking any indication of the holder’s entitlement 
beyond primary and emergency care. Notably, this remainder of the system’s universal 
origins has created the need for specific administrative personal – the so-called 
‘Overseas Visitors Manager’ (OVM) – who are responsible for fulfilling every NHS 
hospital’s legal obligation ‘to determine whether the Charging Regulations apply to any 
overseas visitor they treat’ (Department of Health, 2013a, p. 16). During my interview 
with the OVM of a London hospital, my interviewee received a phone call from the 
hospital’s maternity ward notifying her about the arrival of a new patient. Afterwards 
she explained:  
In that case I would be very very surprised if that person is entitled to NHS 
care. So we will go up to see her, we will ask her to see her documentation. 
I mean she is on the labour ward so I don’t think that’s the right time to ask, 
personally, so I will probably leave that and go after she has given birth. We 
will ask to see her documentation, we will ask her relatives to bring in that 
documentation. It could be that she has got leave to remain. It may have 
been that she just came to see her family and just came down… you know, 
we cannot guarantee that. But that case we would class as suspicious (lon-
A09).  
This is a good example of how ‘NHS staff often have to make assumptions about 
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government policy in their work’, as Wind-Cowie and Wood (2014, p. 55) have noted. 
Asked what will happen in case the patient is not able to prove her entitlement, or even 
to produce a valid passport, my interviewee replied:  
That’s right, they have to produce their passport, which […] will have a 
stamp in it, so that will show whether that person is entitled or not. From 
there, once we have identified her, we will raise an invoice. If she doesn’t 
pay… again: we have to treat this patient, but if she doesn’t pay, then in 
three months time that invoice will be going over to… we will inform the 
Department of Health (lon-A09).  
This is where the incentive of NHS hospitals to recover the costs for often very 
expensive treatments significantly overlaps with the efforts of immigration authorities 
to detect irregular migrants or at least deter their use of public services. According to the 
rules, once identified as an Overseas Visitor, the full costs have to be borne by the 
patient and – if not paid – remain with the hospital. While this creates a significant 
incentive to require payment in advance and otherwise deny treatment (where it is not 
considered ‘urgent’), an official review of this policy also points to a lack of incentive to 
properly identify chargeable patients in the first place (Department of Health, 2012). 
While the efficiency of this system thus depends a lot on individual OVMs doing their 
job well, the proximity between healthcare and immigration policy becomes most 
explicit through a formal mechanism, whereby  
NHS bodies (or debt collection agencies working on their behalf) can share 
non-medical information with the Home Office, via the Department of 
Health, on those with a debt of £1,000 or more once that debt has been 
outstanding for three months, with a view to better collect debts owed. The 
Home Office can then use that information to deny any future immigration 
application to enter or remain in the UK that the person with the debt might 
make (Department of Health, 2013a, p. 63).  
Notably, this information exchange does not require patients’ consent although they 
should be made ‘aware of the potential immigration consequences of not paying’ (ibid.), 
which for Wind-Cowie and Wood (2014, p. 13) ‘poses an enormous ethical challenge 
for healthcare professionals and the NHS as a whole’. A maternity health advocate 
interviewed in Hackney describes this dilemma from the perspective of a midwife:  
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Should she say ‘I will treat you because you are entitled to maternity care, 
but I have to tell you that you will be billed, and if you can’t pay the bill, 
that information will be sent to the Home Office’? I mean, I don’t know 
what I would do if I was a midwife, but that would be the correct 
information (lon-A08). 
This again stands in stark contrast to the situation in Catalonia, but also the rest of 
Spain, where the unconditional entitlement of all minor children and pregnant women to 
free healthcare was left untouched by the 2012 health reform. The UK Department of 
Health (2013b, p. 17) is aware of the inherent problem, noting that ‘[c]linicians are not 
expected to take on the role of immigration officials, but they are often well placed to 
identify visitors who are chargeable’. However, as long as immigration status is the main 
criterion for charging, NHS staff – even if not clinicians themselves – will effectively be 
playing a role in controlling immigration. The account of the above-cited OVM – asked 
how she felt about quasi acting as an immigration officer – clearly reveals these 
ambiguities:  
I don’t think we do. I mean, if you were an immigration officer you would 
be informing immigration [authorities], you would be informing the borders 
agency. And we will work with the borders agency, and we will let the … 
the Department of Health know of patients that owe us money. Now: it’s the 
Department of Health that then would possibly pass that information to the 
Home Office, and it would, you know, then put it on a system so that 
perhaps these people… but they are not traced here! It’s normally the people 
that try to get back [into the UK] that we are stopping. […] So personally I 
don’t think that we work as an immigration officer, … maybe wrongly. 
Perhaps we do (lon-A09).  
This mechanism, as well as recent media reports about the Home Office routinely 
‘accessing NHS records to help track down illegal immigrants’ (Ball, 2014), strikingly 
highlight the lack of what numerous human rights bodies and NGOs call an ‘effective 
firewall’ between the state’s health services and its immigration enforcement agencies 
(FRA, 2013; OHCHR, 2014). Lucy Jones of DOTW says that ‘at the moment […] we 
feel fairly confident that accessing healthcare won’t result in immigration enforcement 
action against undocumented migrants, but increasingly that is a concern’ (lon-A03). 
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Health advocates, professionals and NGO workers interviewed in Barcelona, on the 
other hand, have all made very clear that public services play no part in immigration 
control or even enforcement. It is important, however, to distinguish between the 
behaviour of individuals and the role of (public) institutions as such, as Imma Mata, 
head of the area of immigration within Caritas Barcelona, pointed out:  
It is true that going to social services or to the doctor you can find racist 
people, or people who are against immigrants, and so a migrant can [be 
treated wrongly]. But this is an individual issue […] it is not that the 
educational or sanitary institutions, or social services, would carry out 
controls for the police, or for the ministry of the interior, no. It doesn’t exist 
and nobody would defend that or say that it should exist.  
The comparison of the two cases suggests that while the nature of healthcare always 
leaves significant scope for individual discretion – which in theory could have 
exclusionary as well as inclusionary effects – this discretion becomes most problematic 
where it is not (just) to be based on medical indications but instead systematically 
intersects with the (il)legality of a patient’s residence within a given state.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The question of whether or not, or even to which exact extent irregular migrants should 
be given access to free public healthcare poses a challenge to contemporary welfare 
states. Providing these services to unlawful residents undermines the very idea that their 
presence and claims are fully illegitimate and instead reflects their recognition, by the 
state, as de facto members of society (even if not the nation itself). Restricting their 
access, on the other hand, whether by denying registration, charging the costs or 
involving immigration enforcement, not only tends to breach fundamental human rights 
obligations but also gives raise to serious public health concerns. In this sense, the 
presence of irregular migrants brings two functional imperatives of the state in direct 
opposition: the control of immigration and the provision of healthcare to its population. 
The formal reconciliation of any such opposition hinges on a political decision that 
gives preference to one over the other (in any particular case), and thereby forms the 
basis for the legal framework within which the relevant actors should act. For the 
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resulting laws and regulations to be effective, however, they must not be in conflict with 
the guiding principles and function of the institutions made responsible for their 
implementation, or require the individual actors working within these to comply with 
(or break) a law that they perceive as contrary to their profession. Whatever the 
decision, it should not keep them from doing their job, as the receptionist of a health 
centre put it:  
They [the politicians] are the ones telling us how we must [do our] work, in 
principle, no? This is to say, the system functions a bit according to what 
they tell us. But OK, then we know for ourselves how we can mould it 
[moldearlo]. We are part of this as well, but … of course, sometimes they 
put us a lot of obstacles to be able to do our best possible work, no? 
Sometimes we would like to do more but it’s not possible, because they 
don’t let us (bcn-A13).  
In this article, I have looked at this issue through the theoretical lens provided by 
Brunsson’s (1993) conceptualisation of two alternative relationships between the ideas 
of constituencies or ‘leaders’, and (a particular kind of) organisational action that the 
former cannot simply control without regard to its inherent functional and operational 
logics. What they can do instead, is to either adjust their decisions (or even the 
underlying ideas) to become (more) compatible with these logics: justification; or 
establish and defend a set of rules that is ambiguous enough to serve contradictory aims: 
hypocrisy. Seen from the perspective of individual actors, the former helps them to do 
their job, while the latter puts them in the difficult position of having to manage the 
underlying moral and political conflict by themselves and often on a case-by-case basis.  
Comparing the distinct ways in which the governments of the UK, Spain and Catalonia 
have been managing the local provision of public healthcare to irregular migrants I have 
identified several elements of both justification and hypocrisy. In the UK, where the 
government’s official approach to create a ‘hostile environment’ for irregular migration 
has led the logic of immigration control to increasingly determine more and more areas 
of social policy (including housing, education and health) while chances for 
regularisation are slim, politicians find it difficult to openly justify any inclusion of 
irregular migrants. The way their access to healthcare is managed, both politically and 
in practice, thus very well resembles what Brunsson calls hypocrisy: The state’s 
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overarching aim of preventing any ‘illegitimate’ use of public services is not only 
reflected in the severe restrictions and control of irregular migrants’ access to NHS 
hospital care, but also in the absence of legislation specifying the entitlements they do 
have as local residents, i.e. to receive free primary care. The latter makes even this 
fundamental right less visible – arguably both for the migrants themselves (to 
discourage them from accessing) as well as the indigenous citizenry (to avoid an anti-
immigrant backlash) – and more difficult to assert. Since they cannot be completely 
excluded, however, these entitlements are administratively blurred by placing irregular 
residents in the same category (‘Overseas Visitors’) as suspected ‘health tourists’, 
although they clearly face a very distinct reality (Wind-Cowie & Wood, 2014). Defined 
as such, they are to be identified and charged – by the hospital – even for medically 
necessary treatment such as maternity services, and are thus exposed to a well-founded 
fear that accessing the care they need may jeopardise their stay in the country. In this 
light, the restrictive healthcare reform in Spain, but also the announcement of the 
Spanish Health minister – to restore irregular migrants’ access to primary care while 
explicitly denying them a health card – also appear as a way of deliberately not 
including them into the mainstream system.  
While both national governments at least rhetorically give preference to immigration 
control, the government of Catalonia – which has no competence in that field but is 
responsible for the local provision of healthcare – has deliberately given preference to 
public health. In open contradiction to national legislation it established an explicit legal 
framework and administrative procedure that allows for the progressive inclusion of 
irregular residents into the mainstream system, while (non-resident) ‘health tourists’ are 
to be charged. Through this decision it thus officially justifies irregular migrants being 
treated as ‘legitimate’ recipients of the services provided by CatSalut, thereby absolving 
healthcare workers and institutions from any responsibility to enforce immigration rules 
or even inquire a patient’s administrative status. At the same time, however, the 
procedure requires applicants to approach (usually in person) various public institutions, 
including the National Institute for Social Security (which certifies the lack of national 
health coverage) and the City Council (in order to register as a local resident). 
Obviously, such a system can only work in practice if none of these institutions is 
linked to immigration enforcement and within an environment that is not perceived as 
generally hostile towards irregular migrants. Instead, it ultimately requires a certain 
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acceptance of irregular migration and residence as part of the country’s social reality, 
and thus an issue to be accommodated across the various areas of public policy. In the 
UK in contrast, migrant irregularity is instead portrayed and treated as an issue that 
must (and actually can) be prevented through the extension of immigration control into 
many of these areas, including healthcare. The role of the ‘Overseas Visitors Manager’ 
– responsible for implementing not only the charging regime but also the government’s 
‘hostile environment’ approach within NHS hospitals – most strikingly illustrates this 
gradual shift of responsibilities (and costs) of border control to the healthcare system. 
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